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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
 Scott Clifford McAuley appeals from the judgment entered upon his 
conditional guilty plea to possession of a controlled substance with a persistent 
violator enhancement.  McAuley claims the district court erred in denying his 
motion to suppress.  
 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
  
Deputy Garrett Kinnan was dispatched to a report of an unresponsive 
individual inside a car parked at a Chevron.  (Tr., p.9, Ls.11-19.)  When Deputy 
Kinnan arrived on scene, he located a parked, but running, car and observed a 
man inside the vehicle “who appeared to be asleep or was having what seemed 
like a medical issue[.]”  (Tr., p.10, Ls.3-8, p.15, Ls.12-25.)  The individual, later 
identified as McAuley, did not respond to the deputy’s loud knocking on his 
window, and Deputy Kinnan noticed McAuley was “tossing his head back and 
forth, his eyes were shut, [and] his lips were moving.”  (Tr., p.10, L.6 – p.11, 
L.16.)  Deputy Kinnan requested “medical back up” who responded to the scene 
to assess McAuley.  (Tr., p.11, L.24 – p.12, L.9.)  McAuley was unable to explain 
to medical personnel “where he was at,” “where he was coming from or how long 
he had been there.”  (Tr., p.12, Ls.13-15.)  He was also “[s]low in thought 
process, almost in a confused state.”  (Tr., p.12, Ls.15-16.)  The medical 
personnel left after McAuley signed a “medical release,” but Deputy Kinnan 
remained concerned because he felt McAuley was “impaired.”  (Tr., p.14, L.7 – 




aware that McAuley’s driving privileges were suspended and that he was in 
Idaho without permission from his probation officer.  (Tr., p.16, Ls.1-6, p.17, 
Ls.17-19.)      
Deputy Kinnan arrested McAuley, after which he searched McAuley’s 
vehicle.  (Tr., p.17, L.22 – p.18, L.5.)  The search revealed “several syringes,” 
one containing methamphetamine, “several knives and a firearm.”  (Tr., p.18, 
Ls.6-8.)  McAuley was on parole at the time and was not allowed to possess a 
firearm.  (Tr., p.18, Ls.9-16.) 
The state charged McAuley with possession of a controlled substance, 
unlawful possession of a firearm, and possession of drug paraphernalia.  (R., 
pp.25-26.)  The state also alleged McAuley is a persistent violator.  (R., p.27.) 
McAuley filed a motion to suppress claiming he was unlawfully detained, 
searched, interrogated, and arrested.  (R., p.35.)  The court denied McAuley’s 
motion after an evidentiary hearing.  (See generally Tr., pp.7-49.)  McAuley 
subsequently entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of a controlled 
substance and the enhancement, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his 
suppression motion, and the state dismissed the firearm and paraphernalia 
charges.  (R., pp.68-79, 87; see generally Tr., pp.57-75.)  The district court 
imposed a unified 10-year sentence, with three years fixed, and retained 
jurisdiction.  (R., pp.87-90.)  McAuley filed a timely notice of appeal from the 







 McAuley states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. McAuley’s motion to 
suppress? 
 
(Appellant’s Brief, p.6.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
 
Has McAuley failed to show any error in the district court’s determination 
that McAuley was not entitled to suppression since his initial contact with law 
enforcement was based upon the community caretaking function and, during that 
contact, the deputy developed probable cause to arrest McAuley for driving 









McAuley Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Motion To Suppress 
A. Introduction 
 McAuley concedes “Deputy Kinnan initially encountered [him] pursuant to 
his community caretaking function to perform a medical check” and concedes 
that “[d]uring the course of the medical check, Deputy Kinnan learned that Mr. 
McAuley was driving without privileges.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.7.)  Nevertheless, 
McAuley argues that he was entitled to suppression because, he claims, “Deputy 
Kinnan did not have reasonable suspicion for a drug investigation and his 
continued questioning . . . about drugs prolonged Mr. McAuley’s detention and 
violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment.”1  (Appellant’s Brief, p.7.)  This 
argument is without merit.  Because Deputy Kinnan had probable cause to arrest 
McAuley for driving without privileges, he did not need reasonable suspicion of a 
different offense in order to continue to detain McAuley.  Moreover, 
notwithstanding McAuley’s assertions to the contrary, the district court correctly 
concluded that Deputy Kinnan had reasonable suspicion to believe McAuley had 
been driving under the influence of narcotics and could lawfully detain him to 
confirm or dispel that suspicion.  McAuley has failed to show any error in the 
denial of his suppression motion.   
 
                                                 
1 McAuley’s suppression motion also asserted a Fifth Amendment violation 
based on Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).  (R., pp.39-40.)  On appeal, 
McAuley does not challenge the district court’s denial of this aspect of his motion.  




B. Standard Of Review 
 
“The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated.  When a 
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the 
trial court’s findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely 
reviews the application of constitutional principles to those facts.”  State v. Diaz, 
144 Idaho 300, 302, 160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007). The power to assess the 
credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw 
factual inferences is vested in the trial court.  State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 
102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Fleenor, 133 Idaho 552, 555, 989 
P.2d 784, 787 (Ct. App. 1999).  The appellate court also gives deference to any 
implicit findings of the trial court supported by substantial evidence.  State v. 
Brauch, 133 Idaho 215, 218, 984 P.2d 703, 706 (1999). 
 
C. McAuley Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court’s Denial Of His 
Suppression Motion 
 
“The Fourth Amendment safeguard against unreasonable searches and 
seizures applies to the seizures of persons through arrests or detentions falling 
short of arrest.”  State v. Gutierrez, 137 Idaho 647, 650, 51 P.3d 461, 464 (Ct. 
App. 2002) (citations omitted).  “An arrest for a public offense, whether a felony 
or misdemeanor, may be made upon probable cause.”  State v. Carr, 123 Idaho 
127, 130, 844 P.2d 1377, 1380 (Ct. App. 1992) (citation omitted).  “Driving 
without privileges is a public offense and can be charged as either a felony or 
misdemeanor.”  Id.  Thus, driving without privileges is a crime for which arrest is 




McAuley concedes, as he must, that Deputy Kinnan had probable cause 
to arrest him for driving without privileges, and Deputy Kinnan developed 
probable cause for such an arrest during the medical assessment that was 
initiated pursuant to Deputy Kinnan’s lawful community caretaking function.  
(Appellant’s Brief, pp.7, 8.)  This concession is consistent with the evidence, the 
district court’s factual findings, and the district court’s conclusion that Deputy 
Kinnan had “probable cause at that point for any subsequent seizure that 
occurred.”  (Tr., p.40, L.1 – p.41, L.4.)  Nevertheless, McAuley argues that 
because “Deputy Kinnan could have written [him] a ticket for driving without 
privileges or further investigated that offense,” but “did not do so,” any further 
detention required reasonable suspicion of a different offense, which McAuley 
contends did not exist.  (Appellant’s Brief, p.8.)  This argument is contrary to law.   
That Deputy Kinnan “could have” written a ticket but did not does not 
mean the probable cause for McAuley’s detention disappeared.  Nor did Deputy 
Kinnan’s failure to conduct “further investigat[ion] of that offense” dissipate the 
probable cause, and it is unclear what additional investigation McAuley thinks 
was necessary, much less required.  McAuley cites no authority for the 
proposition that an officer must cite or arrest someone for the same offense that 
provided probable cause for the detention in the first instance in order for the 
detention to be lawful.  Instead, McAuley relies on cases that stand for the 
proposition that “[a] police officer can abandon an investigation to pursue a new 
line of inquiry if he has reasonable suspicion supporting the new line of inquiry.”  




from this principle that reasonable suspicion for a “new line of inquiry” is a 
necessary prerequisite to continuing to detain an individual, despite the existence 
of probable cause, if the individual is not ultimately charged with the offense on 
which the detention was initially based.  This argument is not only unsupported 
by the legal principle upon which McAuley relies, it would essentially require 
officers to arrest for, or the state to charge defendants with, additional crimes.  
Presumably, this is not actually the result McAuley, or any other criminal 
defendant, would advocate.   
A review of State v. Perez-Jungo, 156 Idaho 609, 329 P.3d 391 (Ct. App. 
2014), one of the cases McAuley cites in support of his claim (Appellant’s Brief, 
p.9), further illustrates why McAuley’s reliance on the legal principle from that 
case does not apply.  In Perez-Jungo, an officer saw a vehicle parked on the side 
of a gravel road in the early morning hours and approached the vehicle due to 
“concern that the vehicle was abandoned, the vehicle was stolen, the driver was 
in need of assistance, or the driver may have been involved in recent vandalisms 
of cell towers in the area.”  Perez-Jungo, 156 Idaho at 612, 329 P.3d at 394.  
Upon making contact with the driver, Perez-Jungo, the officer “asked what he 
was doing,” and Perez-Jungo said “he was waiting for a friend and that someone 
had told him there was a potential job site nearby.”  Id.  “The officer noted that 
Perez-Jungo’s eyes were bloodshot and glassy,” but Perez-Jungo denied he had 
been drinking.  Id.  The officer also noticed a statue on Perez-Jungo’s dashboard 
that he recognized as the “patron saint of drug traffickers.”  Id. (footnote omitted).  




Perez-Jungo to exit his vehicle and, while shining a light into the vehicle, the 
officer “saw what appeared to be drug paraphernalia and a controlled substance, 
leading to a search of the vehicle” and Perez-Jungo’s eventual arrest.  Id. at 612-
613, 329 P.3d at 394-395.  
Perez-Jungo filed a motion to suppress, arguing, in relevant part, that his 
detention was unlawfully extended without reasonable suspicion.  Perez-Jungo, 
156 Idaho at 613, 329 P.3d at 395.  Addressing this issue, the Court of Appeals 
explained the relevant legal standards: 
The purpose of a stop is not fixed at the time the stop is initiated.  
Any routine investigative detention might turn up suspicious 
circumstances which could justify an officer asking questions 
unrelated to the initial purpose for the stop.  Such unrelated 
inquiries, if brief, do not necessarily exceed the scope of the initial 
detention and violate a detainee’s Fourth Amendment rights.  
Moreover, an officer’s observations and general inquiries, and the 
events succeeding the stop, may—and often do—give rise to 
legitimate reasons for particularized lines of inquiry and further 
investigation by an officer.  Indeed, a detention initiated for one 
investigative purpose may disclose suspicious circumstances that 
justify expanding the investigation to other possible crimes.  Thus, 
the length and scope of the initial investigatory detention may be 
lawfully expanded if there exist objective and specific articulable 
facts that justify reasonable suspicion that the detained person is, 
has been, or is about to engage in criminal activity. 
 
 Accordingly, our inquiry is directed at determining 
whether the officer had reasonable suspicion, upon resolution 
of the initial justifications for the stop, to continue the 
detention to investigate other possible crimes. 
 
Id. at 614-615, 329 P.3d at 396-397 (citations omitted, emphasis added). 
 Thus, reasonable suspicion of a different crime is only necessary for 
continuing a detention “upon resolution of the initial justifications for the stop.”  Id. 




ended because Deputy Kinnan could have arrested McAuley at any time based 
upon probable cause that McAuley was driving without privileges.  That Deputy 
Kinnan did not do so does not mean the justification ended.  McAuley’s reliance 
on other cases applying the principle articulated in Perez-Jungo to facts where 
the officer could only issue a citation, and could not detain a driver beyond what 
was required to accomplish that task, also do not apply since McAuley was 
subject to arrest, not just a citation.  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.9, 13.) 
 Because Deputy Kinnan did not need any basis for detaining McAuley in 
addition to the probable cause he had to detain and arrest McAuley for driving 
without privileges, the Court need not address McAuley’s argument that the 
district court erred in finding Deputy Kinnan also had reasonable suspicion to 
believe that McAuley was driving under the influence.  Even if considered, 
McAuley’s claim fails.   
“Under Terry [v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)], an investigative detention is 
permissible if it is based upon specific articulable facts which justify suspicion 
that the detained person is, has been, or is about to be engaged in criminal 
activity.”  State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983, 88 P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct. App. 
2003).  “The justification for an investigate detention is evaluated upon the totality 
of the circumstances then known to the officer.”  Id. (citations omitted).   
With respect to reasonable suspicion that McAuley had been driving under 
the influence, the district court found:   
. . . Mr. McAuley was, at the time, seated in the driver’s seat, 
the engine was running, the parking lot is a public place, or it is a 
private property open to the public by the appearance of the video 




Mr. McAuley, upon being approached by the officer, was 
slumped over.  His initial questions to the officer and the paramedic 
appear to be confused -- or his initial answers to their questions.  
The paramedic asks Mr. McAuley, while the officer is standing 
there, where are you at?  Mr. Cauley’s -- Mr. McAuely’s response is 
Burns, Oregon.  Where did you start out today?  Mr. McAuley 
replies, I don’t know, and I don’t remember falling asleep.  Mr. 
McAuley denies taking any medications.  He also tells the 
paramedic something else about falling asleep.   
 
Based on my observations of Mr. McAuley on the video, as 
well as the officer’s testimony about his observations of Mr. 
McAuley, I find that there is a reasonable suspicion in the officer’s 
mind that at the time the paramedics were talking to Mr. McAuley, 
Mr. McAuley play -- may have been operating a motor vehicle 
under the influence of some substance that would justify the 
officer’s detention of Mr. McAuley.     
 
(Tr., p.41, L.15 – p.42, L.13.)   
 Deputy Kinnan’s observations, referenced by the district court, included 
Deputy Kinnan seeing McAuley “tossing his head back and forth, his eyes were 
shut, [and] his lips were moving” (Tr., p.10, Ls.6-15), McAuley’s inability to 
explain to medical personnel “where he was at,” “where he was coming from or 
how long he had been there” (Tr., p.12, Ls.13-15), and McAuley’s “[s]low” 
“thought process,” and “confused state” (Tr., p.12, Ls.15-16).   
McAuley does not challenge any of the factual findings underpinning the 
district court’s finding of reasonable suspicion or even the district court’s 
conclusion that the facts supported a finding of reasonable suspicion that 
McAuley was driving under the influence, but contends “Deputy Kinnan did not 




about to commit, a drug crime.”2  (Appellant’s Brief, p.9.)  It is unclear how this 
complaint is relevant since Deputy Kinnan did not need reasonable suspicion of a 
“drug crime” in order to detain him, and the district court’s determination was not 
based on reasonable suspicion of a “drug crime.”   
McAuley similarly complains that Deputy Kinnan “questioned [him] about 
drugs because of [his] nervous behavior, the way he was answering questions, 
and the fact that he could not recall the exact date he was released from prison,” 
none of which McAuley believes was adequate to “establish reasonable 
suspicion of drug activity.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.12.)  In addition to ignoring the 
actual finding of reasonable suspicion, which was based on driving under the 
influence, McAuley ignores half of the factors noted by the district court and 
testified to by Deputy Kinnan.  The totality of circumstances as set forth by the 
district court, as outlined by Deputy Kinnan, and as reflected in the video of 
Deputy Kinnan’s interaction with McAuley, support the district court’s finding that 
there was reasonable suspicion to believe McAuley was driving under the 
influence.  Although that finding was unnecessary in light of the existence of 
probable cause to arrest McAuley, the finding is supported by the evidence and 
the law.  McAuley has failed to show otherwise.   
                                                 
2 McAuley does not argue, as he did with respect to Deputy Kinnan’s probable 
cause to arrest for driving without privileges, that any reasonable suspicion for 
driving under the influence disappeared once Deputy Kinnan decided not to 
charge him with that offense, but instead charged him with possession of a 
controlled substance, possession of paraphernalia, unlawful possession of a 






The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment entered 
upon McAuley’s conditional guilty plea to possession of a controlled substance 
with a persistent violator enhancement.  
 DATED this 6th day of July, 2016. 
 
      _/s/ Jessica M. Lorello___ 
      JESSICA M. LORELLO 
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